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Abstract 
 
This paper finds that while covered interest rate parity holds for large and small triple 
A rated economies, it holds for emerging markets only for a three-month maturity. For 
a five-year horizon the size and frequency of violations lead to the conclusion that 
covered interest rate parity does not hold for longer maturities for Brazil, Chile, 
Russia and South Korea. Overall this paper finds that aspects of credit risk are the 
source of violations in CIRP in the long-term capital markets rather than transactions 
costs or the size of the economy. 
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Covered Interest Rate Parity in Emerging Markets 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the fundamental tenets of international finance is covered interest rate parity 
CIRP. This relation says that exchange rate forward premiums (discounts) offset 
interest rate differentials between two sovereigns. This paper examines the role of the 
size of the underlying economy, transaction costs and aspects of credit risk such as 
volatility, market and default risk in apparent deviations in CIRP for Brazil, Chile, 
Russia, South Korea, Norway and the United Kingdom. Table I shows that Brazil and 
Russia were rated below investment grade on January 1, 2003, the date that this study 
commences, and all emerging economies were upgraded to some extent by October 
31, 2006, the date that this study ends.
1
 Thus this dataset encompasses a time of fairly 
stable market conditions and remain untainted by the peculiarities of the recent credit 
crunch. Meanwhile Norway and the United Kingdom remain triple A rated throughout 
the sample period. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
CIRP is well established in recent decades amongst the OECD economies for short-
term instruments. Any apparent deviations are due to transactions costs (Taylor 1987, 
1989, Al-Loughani and Moosa 2002, Bhar et al. 2004) and during the extreme market 
conditions of 2007-08, spill over effects from counter party credit risk in the money 
market (Baba and Packer, 2009). Otherwise large deviations after transactions costs 
are rare and fleeting (Louis et al. 1999) and in recent years have virtually disappeared 
(Batten and Szillagyi 2010). Batten et al. (2011) find that market frictions due 
primarily to interest rate volatility cause the parity price to vary within a trading ban. 
Aliber (1973) finds that credit risk can explain violations in CIRP in the pre floating 
exchange rate regime in the late 1960‟s. Another possible reason why covered interest 
rate parity may not hold is tax (Levi, 1977) but Stroble‟s (2001) model finds that 
CIRP remains unaffected by capital gains tax.  
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However Fong et al (2010) find large numbers of deviations in covered interest rate 
parity for the Hong Kong Dollar for the short term capital market. They find evidence 
that most of these deviations are caused by liquidity and credit risk premia yet some 
violations persist and can be exploited by traders able to negotiate small transaction 
fees. Moreover Fletcher and Taylor (1996) also find that deviations from CIRP are 
neither rare nor short lived in the long dated capital market. They do not provide an 
economic reason why this is the case however. Moreover, except for Fong et al. 
(2010) CIRP has not been examined for capital markets outside the OECD club. This 
paper seeks to address these gaps by examining CIRP for Brazil, Chile, Russia and 
South Korea for the short and long-term horizons.  
 
We are also curious to see whether the size of the economy plays any role in evident 
violations in covered interest rate parity.  For instance, the volume of foreign 
exchange transactions can be much smaller for modest sized economies so a lack of 
liquidity can lead to violations in covered interest rate parity. For this reason we also 
examine the United Kingdom, a large triple A rated economy and Norway, a small 
triple A rated economy and compare their results with the emerging market 
economies. 
 
A salient feature of this study is the quality of the data. This study uses time 
synchronised closing daily mid, bid and ask prices for the spot currency, three month 
and five year forward currency exchange rates, three month interest rate, five year 
swap interest rate and five year credit default swap rates as reported by Bloomberg™ 
as of 16:30 British Standard Time BST. Only data for instruments that were flagged 
by Bloomberg™ as actively traded were used. The credit default swap data allows for 
an examination of the role of credit risk and the bid and ask data allows for an 
examination of the role of transaction cost in explaining apparent deviations in CIRP. 
 
In contrast to Fong et al (2010) this paper finds that for a three-month time horizon, 
deviations in CIRP are rare and are nearly fully explained by transaction costs for all 
four emerging markets that are examined. Any remaining violations are trivial. It is 
possible that our results differ from Fong et al (2010) as they use tick data rather than 
time synchronized end of trading day data so violations that occur during the day are 
exploited and arbitraged away by the close of business.  However, we do find that 
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deviations in CIRP can be large and frequent for the long-term capital markets. 
Specifically, after transactions costs Brazil, Chile, Russia and South Korea all show 
some degree of violation in CIRP at a five-year horizon. In contrast Norway and the 
UK show no evidence of violation of covered interest rate parity at either the three-
month or five year horizons.  This suggests that it is credit risk rather than the size of 
the economy that is related to violations in CIRP. While credit default swaps CDS can 
help explain some of the emerging market violations, still large and frequent CIRP 
violations remains. In fact, when insuring deviations from CIRP with CDS the 
deviation from covered interest rate parity often changes sign from a large negative to 
a large positive thereby suggesting that CDS contracts overprice credit risk. However, 
like Fong et al (2010) regressing proxies for aspects of credit risk on deviations from 
covered interest rate parity finds that credit risk is as least part of the explanation for 
these violations as the largest violations of covered interest rate parity are associated 
with factors related to credit risk. Overall this paper finds that there are indeed 
violations in covered interest rate parity in the long-term capital markets but only for 
emerging economies.  Moreover, credit risk rather than the size of the economy or 
transactions costs appear to be the source of these violations. 
 
The plan for this paper is as follows. Section 2 derives CIRP for single and multiple 
periods and show how CIRP can be obtained even in the presence of credit risk. 
Section 3 introduces the data and the methodology. Section 4 presents the numerical 
analysis that examines the size and importance of discrepancies in covered interest 
rate parity. Section 5 conducts a regression analysis on discrepancies in covered 
interest rate parity. Section 6 then summarises and concludes. 
 
2. CIRP with and without credit risk 
 
To appreciate how credit risk impacts on CIRP, it is useful to review classic CIRP in 
detail. The problem faced by an investor wishing to access higher foreign interest 
rates rf > r is shown in the diagram below. Note that S represents the number of 
foreign currency units per USD (i.e. 3 Brazilian reals to $1). 
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Transaction T = 0 T = 1 
Borrow initial investment S0 and agree to pay domestic 
interest rate r and principal with funds received from 
foreign bonds S1 to be converted into dollars one period 
hence. 
S0 -S1 (1+r) 
Convert to foreign currency –S0 and purchase foreign 
bonds paying interest rf. 
-S0 S0 (1+rf) 
Net 0 S0 (1+rf) -S1 (1+r) 
 
After borrowing at the domestic interest rate r, converting dollars to the foreign 
currency S0 and investing in the foreign bonds, the investor can not be sure if a 
depreciation in the exchange rate one period hence S1 will more than offset gains from 
investing in the higher interest rate rf foreign bonds. Therefore the investor will seek 
to hedge by selling the foreign currency one period hence S1 forward F1. As exchange 
rate risk is now eliminated and the above position has no net investment then to avoid 
costless and riskless arbitrage the following must hold.  
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Equation (1a) is the classic interest rate parity condition that must hold in the absence 
of transactions costs. Converting (1a) into returns data by subtracting one from both 
sides of the equation and re-arrange the expression obtains (1b). 
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Now examine CIRP when the investor is uncertain about the credit quality of the 
foreign bond.  
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Transaction T = 
0 
T = 1 (no Default) T = 1 (Default) 
Borrow initial investment S0. Pay 
domestic interest rate r and 
principal with funds received 
from foreign bonds S1. Hedge 
foreign exchange risk today by 
selling S1 forward at exchange 
rate F1. 
S0 -F1 (1+r) -F1 (1+r) 
Convert to foreign currency –S0 
and purchase foreign bonds 
paying interest rf. 
-S0 S0 (1+rf) S0 (1+rf)  
Purchase default insurance C on 
the foreign bond So. 
-CS0 0 S0 (1+rf) (1-) 
Net -CS0 S0 (1+rf) -F1 (1+r) S0 (1+rf) –F1 (1+r) 
 
Now the investor cannot be sure if a default of the foreign bond will eliminate 
promised gains from investing in the higher interest rate rf foreign bonds. Therefore 
the investor will purchase credit protection by purchasing a credit default swap C on 
the foreign bond.
 
If the bond does not default then at maturity the cash flows are 
precisely the same as in the default rate free case as the CDS expires worthless. 
However, if the bond defaults and is now only worth S0 (1+rf) (0    1) then the 
investor receives compensation from the credit protection seller S0 (1+rf)(1-) to top 
up the value of the investment to the promised maturity value S0 (1+rf). Therefore in 
the event of default payoffs from the CDS ensure that the cash flows remain the same 
as in the default free case. 
 
As exchange rate and default risks are now eliminated then to avoid costless and 
riskless arbitrage the following must hold.  
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Equation (2a) is the classic interest rate parity condition as adjusted by default 
insurance C that must hold in the absence of transactions costs.  
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Converting (2a) into returns data by subtracting one from both sides of the equation 
and re-arrange the expression obtains (2b).  
(2b)                                                                                           
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Adjusting (1a) and (2a) for multiple periods is straightforward. The difference 
between S0 and F1 can represent any time frame. Borrowing in dollars and investing in 
the foreign currency can compound at the respective domestic and foreign interest 
rates for any number of time periods. Therefore the N period version of (1a) is simply 
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Default insurance is paid each period. Therefore the N period version of (2a) 
recognises that the credit default swap C is a future value of an annuity.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
One problem encountered in examining covered interest rate parity is a lack of high 
quality observations on long-term interest rates the terms of which are comparable 
across different markets. A ready solution is the interest rate swap market. This 
market has evolved into one of the most important international fixed income markets. 
This instrument allows investors to convert a sequence of floating rate payments into 
a fixed stream and vice versa. The quote is always the fixed rate against the floating 
rate flat, i.e., pay 8% and receive LIBOR flat, and virtually all swaps are governed by 
the terms and conditions specified by the International Swap Dealers Association. 
There is a close relationship between the swap rates and the underlying national yield 
curve as the swap fixed rates are set as a spread off national benchmark bonds. 
Moreover, bid and ask prices are available so transaction costs can also be estimated. 
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Therefore this paper will use the fixed interest rate on domestic and foreign swap 
contracts as the domestic r and foreign rf interest rates in evaluating covered interest 
rate parity for long term capital markets because a) swap terms and conditions are 
comparable across different markets b) swaps are liquid instruments so high quality 
information is available even for long terms in emerging markets c) swap rates are 
closely related to the underlying national bond markets and reflect the interest rates 
available for borrowing and investment. 
 
The data for this study is collected as of 16:30 BST from Bloomberg™. The data 
consists of the ask, mid and bid data for the spot and the three month and five year 
forward exchange rates, the US domestic and foreign fixed rates on three-month 
deposits and five year interest rate swaps and finally five year CDS premiums. The 
CDS premiums are based on a notional five-year bond of the sovereign. This paper 
uses a five-year horizon to examine the long-term capital market performance of 
covered interest rate parity because CDS and interest rate swaps are most frequently 
traded at that maturity. A complete set of data is collected for Brazil, Chile, Russia, 
South Korea and, except for CDS rates, the United Kingdom and Norway. This means 
the dataset consists of 18 data series for each country (15 for the UK and Norway) and 
including the ask, mid and bid data for the two interest rate maturities for the US, 108 
data series in all.  
 
For each country and maturity, a complete set of exchange rate, interest rate and CDS 
data is collected on a given day only if Bloomberg™ flags that all markets are active 
for that date. Bloomberg™ defines an “active trading day” for a market as a day when 
there is at least one transaction in the underlying instrument. The data was collected 
from January 1, 2003 until October 31, 2006 thereby avoiding the unusual market 
conditions surrounding the credit crunch period and the virtual collapse of the 
sovereign CDS market. As the CDS market (and the five year currency forward 
market for Norway) started at different dates for each country, the number of data 
points available for a given country and maturity varies from as little at 211 days for 
Russian to as much as 836 days for the UK but in total the full dataset amounts to 
5,995 observations, 2,893 for emerging markets and 1,672 for the UK and 1,430 for 
Norway.
2
 The characteristics of the emerging market data and the UK, Norway and 
United States data is reported in Table 2a and Table 2b respectively.  
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[Place Tables 2a and 2b about here] 
 
Table 2a reports that when compared to the normal distribution, the distributions of 
the different data series range from the typical time series properties of excess kurtosis 
and positive skewness for Chile‟s exchange rate data to negative kurtosis and negative 
skewness for Brazil‟s exchange rate data. Typically the longer the term of the data the 
greater the variation as measured by the standard deviation. However the interest rate 
data is a clear exception where typically the five-year interest rate swap data is less 
variable than the three-month interest rate data. Table 2b reports that the UK, Norway 
and US interest rate data also follow this pattern. Returning to Table 2a, relative to its 
mean the credit default swap data displays the greatest range of all the variables 
followed by the five-year forward rate. The range for credit default swap data is 
largest for Brazil and the range for the five-year forward rate is largest for Chile. 
 
The examination of CIRP proceeds in three steps. The first step is to evaluate standard 
covered interest rate parity and covered interest rate parity adjusted for credit risk 
using the closing daily mid price for the spot and forward exchange rates, the US and 
foreign interest rates and where applicable the credit default swap rates for Brazil, 
Chile, Russia, South Korea, Norway and the UK for three month and five-year 
horizons. This evaluation will give us the largest possible number of violations of 
covered interest rate parity, as there is no adjustment for transactions costs.  
 
The second step corrects CIRP for transactions costs using information contained in 
the bid ask spread for all of the data series. Depending upon the inventory position of 
the market maker, transactions can occur at the extremes of the lower bid and higher 
ask rather than at the mid price. Therefore covered interest rate parity is calculated at 
the extremes of assuming all transactions work towards widening the interest rate 
differentials for CIRP (5a) thereby forming the lower limit for forward differentials 
and again by assuming all transactions work towards widening the spot forward 
exchange rate premium for CIRP (5b) thereby forming the upper limit for forward 
differentials without default insurance. Therefore, (5a) and (5b) forms the range of 
within which covered interest rate parity still holds.       
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In particular the superscripts A and B refer to the ask and bid prices respectively. Note 
that in (5a) the currency is bought forward at the lowest possible (bid) price and sold 
spot as the highest possible (ask) price. Meanwhile the interest rate differentials are at 
the highest possible values. Together the lowest possible forward premium along with 
the highest possible interest rate differential forms the lower limit of CIRP that is 
consistent with the structure of transaction cost.  Inspection of (5b) reveals that the bid 
and ask prices work towards obtaining the highest possible forward premium and 
lowest possible interest rate differential that is consistent with covered interest rate 
parity adjusted for transactions costs.  
 
Similarly, (6a) and (6b) represents the lower and upper limits consistent with CIRP 
when adjusting CIRP for the impact of credit risk as well as transactions cost. This 
range will be wider due to the presence of the additional credit default swap 
transaction.                                                  
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The third step is to regress explanatory factors against deviations (violations) in 
covered interest rate parity DCIRP after adjusting for transactions costs but without 
adjusting for CDS premiums to see if credit risk can provide an explanation for 
deviations in CIRP. This step is necessary because Duffie (1999) points out that credit 
default swaps only imperfectly insure against default so violations in CIRP due to 
credit risk can still persist even after adjusting for credit default swap premiums and 
transactions cost. Moreover, Blanco et al. (2005) empirically verify Duffie (1999) by 
finding that CDS prices are often much larger than the credit spread for corporate 
bonds.  
 
Bearing this fact in mind a regressions model is run where the dependant variable is 
DCIRP after adjusting for transactions costs but without adjusting for CDS premiums. 
These DCIRP will be cases of violations of the lower (5a) and the upper limits (5b).  
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This does mean that the sign of the DCIRP is ambiguous since an “increase” in 
DCIRP can be an increase in the “negativeness” of a violation in the lower limit (an 
inverse relation), or an increase in the “positiveness” of the upper limit (a direct 
relation). This can cause problems in interpreting the coefficients in the later 
regressions. For example, as explained later in detail, an increase in volatility should 
be associated with “an increase” in DCIRP. However, “an increase” in DCIRP could 
be a further leftward movement beyond the lower limit 5(a) that is mathematically a 
negative relation with volatility, or a further rightward movement beyond the upward 
limit 5(b) that is mathematically a positive relation with volatility. Therefore the 
dependant variable for the regression analysis is the absolute value of the DCIRP so 
that an “increase” in DCIRP means a movement away from covered interest rate 
parity in either the positive or negative direction. 
 
The literature provides guidance as to the likely candidates for factors that can be 
associated with violations in CIRP. Elton et al. (2001) find that a major portion of the 
credit spread for corporate bonds can be explained by the Fama and French (1993) 
risk factors. Therefore proxies for potential sources of risk that can lead to credit loses 
in attempting to exploit violations in CIRP include the Fama and French factors for 
market risk MF, size SMB and value HML.
3
 However all three factors prove to be 
more correlated with each other than with DCIRP. Moreover later regressions showed 
clear evidence of high collinearity amongst these three variables so the MF is chosen 
as the appropriate market risk factor.
4
  
 
The market factor MF represents the value weighted return of the US stock market in 
excess of the risk free rate. The data from this series is collected from French‟s data 
library. We expect that there is a positive correlation between returns on the stock 
market and the bond market so when the return in the stock market is high so too is 
the return in the corporate bond market. In the mean time, better returns on the stock 
and bond markets imply that it is less likely that the sovereign market will default on 
its debt obligations so deviations in covered interest rate parity DCIRP will decrease. 
 
Apart from the Fama and French (1993) factors changes in the VIX index VIX and 
changes in the slope of the Treasury curve SLOPE are also chosen as proxies for 
credit risk. The VIX index measures the implied volatility of the near-term at-the-
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money S&P 500 index options. The VIX index rises when uncertainty does since an 
increase in volatility increases option prices. Taylor (1989), Bhar et al. (2004) and 
Batten and Szillagyi (2010) suggest that market turbulence can be related to violations 
in CIRP. Therefore as the VIX index and therefore market volatility increases DCIRP 
increases possibly because governments are more likely to default on their debt during 
turbulent market conditions. The VIX data is collected from DataStream. 
 
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin (1997) find that increases in 
the slope of the term structure foreshadow improvements in real economic activity 
while Estrella and Mishkin (1998) find that decreases in the slope of the term 
structure indicates an increased likelihood of future recessions. Therefore an increase 
in the slope of the Treasury yield curve would foreshadow good economic conditions 
worldwide leading to a decrease in covered interest rate parity violations as foreign 
governments are less likely to default if good economic conditions are expected to 
occur. The slope is measured as the difference between the ten-year constant maturity 
Treasury yield less the three-month T-bill yield. This data is collected from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
 
Finally DCIRP will be mathematically rather than economically related to the levels 
of the market premium, market volatility and the term structure slope because 
deviations in covered interest rate parity DCIRP is a spread. Therefore the model is 
computed in the first differences.  In summary the regression model is as follows. 
 
(7)                                 SLOPEVIXMFDCIRP t,m,it3t2t10t,m,i   
 
where,  
 
DCIRPi,m,t: change in the absolute value of the deviation in covered interest rate 
parity after transactions costs for country “i” and maturity „m‟ at date„t‟. 
 
MFt: change in the return on the US stock market in excess of the risk free rate at 
date t. 1 is negative. 
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VIXt : change in the VIX index level at date „t‟. 2 is positive. 
 
SLOPEt : change in the slope of term structure of interest rates as measured by the 
difference between ten year and three month constant maturity US Treasury yields at 
date„t‟. 3 is negative. 
 
4. Numerical Analysis 
 
We now examine deviations in returns from covered interest rate parity evaluated at 
the mid transaction prices. The deviations in returns are examined twice, first without 
adjusting for credit risk by subtracting the right hand side of (1b) from its left hand 
side and second after adjusting for credit risk by subtracting the right hand side of (2b) 
from its left hand side. This step examines covered interest rate parity assuming that 
transactions costs are zero and so should provide the strictest condition on interest rate 
parity. The results are reported in Table 3 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 measures the mean and standard deviation of deviations in returns from 
covered interest rate parity DCIRP for the entire sample period and for the first and 
second half sub-periods.
5
 If covered interest rate parity were to hold then the mean 
deviations in returns would be zero. A positive mean indicates that returns on foreign 
exchange is “too high” relative to returns on interest rates while a negative mean 
indicates that returns on interest rates are “too high” relative to returns on foreign 
exchange. If violations in covered interest rate parity were caused by credit risk, we 
would expect that the mean deviation in returns on covered interest parity would be 
negative. The foreign interest rate would include a risk premium to compensate 
investors for perceived credit risk and so the foreign interest rate would be “too large” 
relative to the US interest rate than that suggested by interest rate parity conditions 
alone. 
 
Table 3 shows that the mean and the standard deviation in DCIRP without adjusting 
for credit default swaps increase with maturity but except for two instances are not 
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statistically significant. The exceptions are both in the last half of the available data 
where at three months DCIRP is negative and significant for the UK and at five years 
DCIRP is negative and significant for Russia. The size of these violations at three 
months is typically very small, ranging from a fraction of a basis point for Russia and 
the UK, to a little more than five basis points for South Korea. At five years however, 
all of the emerging markets show evidence of a massive violation in covered interest 
rate parity where the DCIRP are at least 20 basis points for the entire period. It is 
interesting to note that in contrast to the UK at three months, the negative and 
statistically significant DCIRP for Russia at five years in the second half of the data is 
large and so this violation in CIRP looks economically as well as statistically 
significant. In contrast, the UK DCIRP is little more than a single basis point. Norway 
represents an intermediate case where DCIRP is above 10 basis points in the first sub-
period. 
 
Table 3 also hints that insuring apparent violations in covered interest rate parity 
against credit risk by using credit default swaps is liable to be ineffective in most 
cases. For all but Chile, column 3 of Table 3 shows that DCIRP at five years that are 
above 10 basis points is negative; suggesting that credit risk can explain why these 
larger deviations occur. However as shown in the last column of Table 3 insuring 
these deviations against credit risk by purchasing CDS typically creates larger DCIRP 
and often of the opposite sign. South Korea is an exception where negative DCIRP of 
more than 28 basis points are reduced to less than 8 basis points when insuring these 
deviations against credit risk. 
 
Table 3 reports the “raw” DCIRP that are unadjusted for transactions cost. Many of 
these evident DCIRP can disappear once transactions cost incurred in order to exploit 
them are accounted for. Table 4 reports that DCIRP decrease once CIRP is adjusted 
for the impact of transactions cost and none of these deviations are statistically 
significant. The average DCIRP is trivially small, less than one basis point for Brazil, 
Chile, Russia, Norway and the UK and barely 2 basis points for South Korea at three 
months maturity. However, moving into longer time horizons DCIRP, although 
statistically insignificant, still remains high for all emerging markets, ranging from six 
basis points for Chile to a very large 94 basis points for Brazil. In contrast DCIRP 
remain trivial only for Norway and the UK. 
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[Table 4 about here] 
 
Insuring these DCIRP against credit risk via CDS is usually ineffective. After 
transactions costs, the CDS insured deviations are actually larger for Chile and larger 
and of the opposite sign for Brazil and Russia. These results are consistent with 
Blanco et al. (2005) who find that CDS prices are too large relative to the credit 
spread implying that credit risk is overpriced by CDS. South Korea is an exception 
however since insuring DCIRP using CDS reduces deviations of approximately 22 
basis points for five years maturity to less than four basis points.  
 
While Table 4 reports the average DCIRP after transactions and credit insurance costs 
one would also like information concerning the number and frequency of evident 
DCIRP. Table 5 addresses this gap by reporting the number and sample frequency of 
DCIRP after adjusting for transactions costs. The incidence of DCIRP is infrequent, 
less than 10% of the sample size, for Brazil, Chile, Russia and Norway at three 
months maturity. Surprisingly the incidence of DCIRP for the UK is nearly 20% and 
for South Korea nearly 40% at three months maturity. However, combined with the 
trivially small average size of transaction adjusted DCIRP as reported in Table 4, it is 
evident that covered interest rate parity holds at three months for all countries in the 
sample.
6
  
 
On the other hand, the frequency of DCIRP is larger and sometimes very large at five 
years maturity all four emerging markets as well as Norway. For the emerging 
markets, even when insuring these DCIRP against credit risk via CDS does not 
materially reduce the frequency of DCIRP. Recognising that Table 4 reports that the 
average DCIRP is generally not small for longer maturities, one is compelled to 
conclude that covered interest rate parity does not hold for these emerging markets for 
longer terms. Meanwhile the number of violations of CIRP is less than five percent 
for the UK. Combined with the trivial size of these violations as reported in Table 4, it 
is evident that covered interest rate parity holds for the UK at five years maturity. 
Similarly, we conclude that CIRP holds at five years for Norway as well as the 
average size of violations in Table 4 are so small that any profits to be gained by 
trading on violations of CIRP are economically trivial.
7
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[Table 5 about here] 
  
5. Regression analysis 
 
The numerical analysis concludes that while covered interest rate parity does hold for 
the UK and Norway in the short and long term and for the emerging markets for the 
short term, it does not hold for emerging markets for longer-term maturities. 
Therefore we would like to explain these deviations by regressing common proxies 
for aspects of credit risk such as market risk premiums, volatility and default risk on 
the absolute value of DCIRP. 
 
It is natural to suggest that market turbulence can be related to DCIRP (Taylor 1989), 
and in fact Bhar et al. (2004) and Batten and Szillagyi (2010) find statistical evidence 
that this is so. Moreover the regression model (7) finds that autocorrelation is 
sometimes present. This naturally suggests that (7) could be affected by 
“autocorrelation in volatility” so the first step is to test to see if ARCH effects are 
present in (7). When ARCH effects are present then (7) is augmented by (8) according 
to the procedures as established by Bollerslev (1986) and Taylor (1986). This needs to 
be done since standard errors are biased and inconsistent in the presence of ARCH 
effects. GARCH models are a particularly attractive method for correcting for ARCH 
errors since a GARCH model is a parsimonious representation of an infinite order 
ARCH model that avoids overfitting (see Brooks 2002). 
 
Since there is little theoretical justification for anything other than first order GARCH 
errors a GARCH (1,1) model is run when there is evidence that ARCH effects are 
present. In this case the error term in (7) is estimated as seen in (8) below. 
 
(8)                                                                                  2 1,,
2
1,,
2
,,   tmitmitmi 
 
Specifically the volatility of the error term in (7) depends upon a constant 0, 
information on last period‟s volatility 1
2
i,m,t-1
 
and the fitted variance from the 
previous period 2i,m,t-1. GARCH (1,1) models are non-linear and so are estimated 
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via maximum likelihood. If there is no evidence of ARCH effects or if there are 
estimation problems with GARCH (1,1) then (7) is run using OLS and robust standard 
errors as suggested by White (1980) and if autocorrelation is present then (7) is run 
using an autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity consistent estimate according to the 
Newey and West (1987) procedure. 
 
The results of these econometric procedures are presented in Table 6.
8
  The first row 
for each country and maturity reports the results of two chi-square tests, the first tests 
whether the underlying OLS model is statistically significant and the second tests 
whether the error term in (7) displays ARCH effects. If the ARCH effects test is 
significant, (7) is augmented by a GARCH (1,1) model for the error term and the 
results report values for the coefficients of the constant 0, the lagged volatility 1 and 
last period‟s fitted variance  for the error structure according to (8). However we find 
that the GARCH estimates are not valid for Russia at three months and for Brazil at 
five years. Specifically GARCH discovers a non-stationary unconditional variance for 
Russia because 1 +  > 1 and GARCH violate the non negativity constraint for 
Brazil as   < 0. Therefore we report Newey and West (1987) estimates for the 
DCIRP for Russia at three months and for Brazil at five years instead. 
 
The coefficients for the market factor MF, the VIX index and for the slope of the US 
term structure SLOPE are statistically significant and of the expected sign in six 
instances. Notice that at five years maturity for Brazil and South Korea, where Table 
4 reports the largest negative DCIRP after transactions costs (but not including default 
insurance) and Table 5 reports an extraordinary large percentage of violations in 
covered interest rate parity (85 and 71% respectively), we find evidence that five of 
the six coefficients associated with aspects of credit risk is statistically significant. In 
other words, where there is strong evidence of violations in covered interest rate 
parity, there is the strongest evidence that DCIRP is related to aspects of credit risk.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper examines deviations in covered interest rate parity for Brazil, Chile, 
Russia, South Korea, Norway and the UK. While there is little evidence of any 
 18 
violation in covered interest rate parity at three months maturity, the size and 
frequency of violations in covered interest rate volatility increase with maturity for the 
four emerging markets. This study concludes that covered interest rate parity holds for 
the UK and Norway for short and long-term capital markets but holds for the 
emerging markets only for the short term.  
 
Insuring against default using credit default swaps did not seem to materially affect 
these results. When insuring DCIRP with CDS the violation in covered interest rate 
parity often merely change sign from a large negative to a large positive thereby 
suggesting that CDS overprice credit risk. However, this study still finds that these 
violations can be attributed to aspects of credit risk as the largest violations in covered 
interest rate parity in the emerging markets are associated with factors related to credit 
risk. Overall this paper finds that there are indeed violations in covered interest rate 
parity in the long-term capital markets but only for emerging markets. Moreover the 
source of these violations is likely to be credit risk rather than the size of the economy 
or transactions costs. 
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Table 1 
This table reports the credit rating history of Brazil, Chile, Russia, South Korea, 
Norway and the United Kingdom UK from January 1, 2003 to October 31, 2006 
according to Standard & Poor. Standard & Poor‟s credit system ranks AAA as the 
highest possible credit rating and AA, A and BBB are investment grade whereas BB 
and B are below investment grade. Modifiers of + and - indicate that the sovereign are 
at the upper and lower end respectively of the broad rating class. 
Rating date Brazil Chile Russia South 
Korea 
Norway UK 
January 1, 2003 B+ A- BB A- AAA AAA 
January 14, 2004 B+ A BB A- AAA AAA 
January 27, 2004 B+ A BB+ A- AAA AAA 
September 17, 2004  BB- A BB+ A- AAA AAA 
January 31,2005 BB- A BBB- A- AAA AAA 
July 27, 2005 BB- A BBB- A AAA AAA 
December 15, 2005 BB- A BBB A AAA AAA 
February 28, 2006 BB A BBB A AAA AAA 
September 4, 2006 BB A BBB+ A AAA AAA 
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Table 2a 
Moving to the right from column two, this table reports the sample statistics for the 
spot exchange rate, the three month and five year forward exchange rates, the three 
month and five year interest rates and the five year credit default swap rates for 
Brazil, Chile, Russia and South Korea. Exchange rate data is in foreign currency units 
per United States Dollar, interest rates are in percent and all CDS data are in basis 
points. 
Brazil Spot FX FR 3MO FR 5YR IR 3MO SW 5YR CDS 5YR 
Mean 2.69 2.78 4.71 15.38 17.05 409.31 
Median 2.82 2.91 4.85 15.65 17.03 405.00 
Std Dev 0.33 0.35 1.04 1.80 2.10 194.67 
Kurtosis -0.94 -0.89 -0.88 -1.05 -0.14 -0.79 
Skewness -0.65 -0.67 -0.24 -0.25 0.09 0.06 
Range 1.15 1.23 3.73 6.85 10.59 747.93 
Minimum 2.06 2.11 3.03 12.00 12.73 108.89 
Maximum 3.21 3.34 6.76 18.85 23.32 856.82 
No Obs. 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Chile       
Mean 546.51 547.27 588.68 4.78 6.24 23.37 
Median 537.13 537.16 579.40 5.25 6.43 21.13 
Std Dev 33.82 34.28 41.89 0.97 0.51 12.43 
Kurtosis 8.62 8.82 19.78 0.59 1.00 48.49 
Skewness 2.50 2.53 3.83 -1.24 -1.01 6.87 
Range 207.45 209.74 323.95 3.78 3.54 99.94 
Minimum 510.70 510.85 547.10 1.91 3.65 17.56 
Maximum 718.15 720.59 871.05 5.69 7.19 117.50 
No Obs 372 356 372 356 372 372 
Russia       
Mean 27.39 27.35 28.60 4.34 6.41 58.57 
Median 27.05 27.00 27.92 4.35 6.40 57.50 
Std Dev 0.67 0.72 1.20 0.79 0.23 8.05 
Kurtosis -0.85 -0.80 0.08 0.72 -0.88 -0.37 
Skewness 0.74 0.73 1.06 0.25 0.10 0.65 
Range 2.17 2.40 4.37 5.05 1.18 35.00 
Minimum 26.66 26.52 27.35 2.31 5.82 44.50 
Maximum 28.83 28.92 31.72 7.36 7.00 79.50 
No Obs 211 211 211 211 211 211 
South Korea       
Mean 1040.66 1041.83 1036.25 4.07 4.66 41.71 
Median 1016.50 1016.00 1007.55 4.06 4.74 31.67 
Std Dev 87.93 92.24 113.42 0.42 0.39 26.80 
Kurtosis -0.60 -0.59 -0.75 -1.22 0.42 6.46 
Skewness 0.84 0.86 0.77 0.02 -0.87 2.34 
Range 330.15 341.95 383.95 1.63 2.02 163.83 
Minimum 927.80 924.80 894.90 3.43 3.34 22.00 
Maximum 1257.95 1266.75 1278.85 5.06 5.36 185.83 
No Obs 560 533 560 533 560 560 
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Table 2b 
Moving to the right from column two, this table reports the sample statistics for the 
spot exchange rate, the three month and five year forward exchange rates and the 
three month interest rate and five year swap interest rate for the United Kingdom. 
Panel two reports the sample statistics for the three-month and five year interest rates 
for the United States. Exchange rate data is in United States Dollars per Pound 
Sterling and interest data are in percent. 
UK Spot FX FR 3MO FR 5YR IR 3MO SW 5YR 
Mean 1.79 1.78 1.74 4.40 4.85 
Median 1.80 1.80 1.77 4.53 4.88 
Std Dev 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.47 0.37 
Kurtosis -0.33 -0.29 -0.70 -0.38 -0.05 
Skewness -0.69 -0.71 -0.52 -0.94 -0.40 
Range 0.40 0.40 0.45 1.83 1.88 
Minimum 1.55 1.54 1.48 3.26 3.77 
Maximum 1.95 1.94 1.92 5.09 5.65 
No Observations 836 836 836 836 836 
Norway      
Mean 6.62 6.62 6.56 2.53 4.11 
Median 6.59 6.57 6.33 2.27 4.02 
Std Dev 0.34 0.36 0.59 0.95 0.58 
Kurtosis -0.13 -0.25 -0.38 6.06 0.89 
Skewness 0.46 0.50 0.80 2.46 1.05 
Range 1.64 1.71 3.12 4.71 2.75 
Minimum 6.01 5.98 4.92 1.62 3.29 
Maximum 7.65 7.69 8.04 6.33 6.04 
No Observations 715 715 715 715 715 
United States      
Mean N/A N/A N/A 4.78 6.24 
Median N/A N/A N/A 5.25 6.43 
Std Dev N/A N/A N/A 0.97 0.51 
Kurtosis N/A N/A N/A 0.59 1.00 
Skewness N/A N/A N/A -1.24 -1.01 
Range N/A N/A N/A 3.78 3.54 
Minimum N/A N/A N/A 1.91 3.65 
Maximum N/A N/A N/A 5.69 7.19 
No Observations N/A N/A N/A 356 372 
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Table 3 
This table shows the mean and standard deviation SD of deviations in covered interest 
rate parity DCIRP, measured in basis points on an annualised basis and evaluated at 
the mid transaction prices, for the time horizon of three months and five years.  For 
the five-year horizon DCIRP is also evaluated after purchasing default insurance 
using credit default swaps CDS. These statistics are reported for the overall sample, 
(all) and for the first half (first) and second half (last) of the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level
 
 
 
 
 Three Months Five Years  Five Years 
 After CDS 
Mean Brazil 1.99 -140.01 206.85 
Mean First 2.96 -195.32 284.25 
Mean Last 1.02 -84.36 128.97 
SD all 8.63 214.55 210.72 
SD First 9.37 268.19 238.40 
SD Last 7.71 118.53 141.42 
Mean Chile -2.83 19.88 39.35 
Mean First -3.71 -1.51 20.83 
Mean Last -1.94 41.27 57.86 
SD all 3.58 38.88 37.25 
SD First 3.64 30.92 30.32 
SD Last 3.29 33.99 34.27 
Mean Russia 0.25 -25.02 23.26 
Mean First -1.34 -14.45 34.10 
Mean Last 1.85 -35.49*** 12.53 
SD all 11.08 18.63 21.17 
SD First 11.29 17.80 19.88 
SD Last 10.67 12.55 16.47 
South Korea  -5.15 -28.62 7.54 
Mean First -4.94 -47.95 3.07 
Mean Last -5.36 -9.29 12.02 
SD all 8.78 34.67 17.21 
SD First 10.70 38.93 19.87 
SD Last 6.32 11.96 12.59 
Mean Norway -1.80 -4.41 N/A 
Mean First -1.85 -10.75 N/A 
Mean Last -1.75 1.95 N/A 
SD all 1.22 11.60 N/A 
SD First 1.45 9.47 N/A 
SD Last 0.94 9.95 N/A 
Mean UK -0.87 -1.29 N/A 
Mean First -0.26 -1.81 N/A 
Mean Last -1.48*** -0.77 N/A 
SD all 1.55 3.77 N/A 
SD First 1.93 4.48 N/A 
SD Last 0.58 2.80 N/A 
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Table 4 
This table examines the influence of transactions costs in explaining deviations in 
covered interest rate parity DCIRP. DCIRP is measured as the amount by which the 
covered interest rate parity condition is above or below the boundaries established by 
the bid and ask prices for spot and forward currency, interest rate and (if applicable) 
credit default swap transactions. The mean and standard deviation SD of DCIRP after 
transactions costs, measured in basis points on an annualised basis, are reported for 
the time horizon of three months and five years. The column including the label “after 
CDS” represent remaining DCIRP after accounting for the additional transactions cost 
incurred in attempting to insure covered interest rate parity discrepancies for credit 
risk. These statistics are reported for the overall sample, (all) and for the first half 
(first) and second half (last) of the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brazil Chile 
 Three 
Months 
Five 
Years  
Five Years  
After CDS 
Three 
Months 
Five 
Years  
Five Years  
After CDS 
Mean all 0.18 -93.96 107.28 -0.03 5.79 12.04 
Mean 
First 0.45 -131.24 143.43 -0.08 -2.97 0.29 
Mean 
Last -0.09 -56.45 70.92 0.02 14.56 23.78 
SD all 3.54 168.38 167.05 0.31 24.77 22.27 
SD First 3.68 213.74 203.03 0.38 24.53 3.30 
SD Last 3.39 90.91 109.68 0.21 21.78 26.57 
 Russia South Korea 
Mean all -0.16 -6.85 13.70 -1.78 -22.25 3.75 
Mean 
First -0.72 -6.13 23.72 -2.10 -39.52 0.83 
Mean 
Last 0.39 -7.56 3.78 -1.47 -4.98 6.68 
SD all 4.47 11.81 20.62 6.98 32.24 11.10 
SD First 4.95 13.69 24.77 8.95 37.58 12.21 
SD Last 3.86 9.62 6.53 4.20 8.40 8.99 
 Norway UK 
Mean all -0.28 0.24 N/A 0.04 -0.07 N/A 
Mean 
First -0.55 -0.96 
N/A 
0.07 0.04 
N/A 
Mean 
Last -0.01 1.44 
N/A 
0.02 -0.17 
N/A 
SD all 5.09 4.75 N/A 1.53 4.86 N/A 
SD First 7.19 2.93 N/A 2.15 6.53 N/A 
SD Last 0.06 5.81 N/A 0.26 2.14 N/A 
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Table 5 
This table reports the number of times T a trader could make a profit, after accounting 
for transactions costs, by exploiting deviations in covered interest rate parity from 
January 1, 2003 to October 31, 2006. Only those observations for dates when 
Bloomberg flags all instruments as being active are examined. These statistics are 
reported for the overall sample, (all) and for the first half (first) and second half (last) 
of the sample. 
 
 Three Months Five Years 
 N T Without 
CDS 
N T Without 
CDS T With CDS 
Brazil (All) 325 21 325 278 217 
(First) 163 5 163 128 114 
 (Last) 162 16 162 150 103 
% (All) N/A 6.46 N/A 85.54 66.77 
% (First) N/A 3.07 N/A 78.53 69.94 
% (Last) N/A 9.88 N/A 92.59 63.58 
Chile (All) 356 12 372 107 139 
 (First) 178 10 186 10 4 
 (Last) 178 2 186 97 135 
% (All) N/A 3.37 N/A 28.76 37.37 
% (First) N/A 5.62 N/A 5.35 2.14 
% (Last) N/A 1.12 N/A 51.87 72.19 
Russia  (All) 211 19 211 108 115 
 (First) 106 12 106 44 77 
 (Last) 105 7 105 64 38 
% (All) N/A 9.00 N/A 51.18 54.50 
% (First) N/A 11.32 N/A 41.51 72.64 
% (Last) N/A 6.67 N/A 60.95 36.19 
South Korea  533 207 560 401 333 
 (First) 266 77 280 247 163 
 (Last) 267 130 280 154 170 
% (All) N/A 38.84 N/A 71.61 59.46 
% (First) N/A 28.95 N/A 88.21 58.21 
% (Last) N/A 48.69 N/A 55.16 60.50 
Norway  (All) 715 19 715 195 N/A 
 (First) 358 15 358 68 N/A 
 (Last) 357 4 357 127 N/A 
% (All) N/A 2.66 N/A 27.27 N/A 
% (First) N/A 4.19 N/A 18.99 N/A 
% (Last) N/A 1.12 N/A 35.57 N/A 
UK  (All) 836 153 836 38 N/A 
 (First) 418 72 418 20 N/A 
 (Last) 418 81 418 18 N/A 
% (All) N/A 18.30 N/A 4.55 N/A 
% (First) N/A 17.22 N/A 4.78 N/A 
% (Last) N/A 19.38 N/A 4.31 N/A 
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Table 6 
This table reports the results of regressing changes in the Fama and French (1993) 
market factor MF, the Vix index VIX and the US yield curve SLOPE on deviations in 
covered interest rate parity after transactions costs. The first chi-square statistic 
reports the results of the test whether the OLS version of the regression is statistically 
significant; the second chi-square statistic reports the results of the test whether 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic errors are present. If significant, a 
nonlinear GARCH (1,1) model is estimated rather than an OLS model to correct for 
first order autocorrelation and heteroskedastic errors.  
 Three Month: DF = 316 Five Year: DF = 316 
Brazil (3) = 25.7*** (5) = 129.7*** (3) = 12.1** Non negative 
constraint 
violated
 
Parameter Coef. Std Err Coef. Std Err 
Constant 0.0047 0.0033 0.0016 0.0475 
MF -0.0735* 0.0385 -1.3310*
 
0.8074 
VIX -0.0013 0.0018 0.1377* 0.0786 
SLOPE -0.0322 0.0343 -1.4083* 0.8395 
0  0.0012*** 0.0000 N/A N/A 
1 -0.0030** 0.0014 N/A N/A 
 0.5892*** 0.0428 N/A N/A 
 Three Month: DF = 347 Five Year: DF = 367 
Chile (3) = 1.5 (5) = 98.8*** (3) =3.7 (5) =0.8 
Parameter Coef.  Std Err Coef. Std Err 
Constant 0.0004 0.0010 0.0104 0.0473 
MF 0.0085 0.0130 -0.7850 0.5287 
VIX 0.0015 0.0014 0.0312 0.0328 
SLOPE -0.0018 0.0038 -0.5608 0.4603 
0  0.0001 0.0001 N/A N/A 
1 0.2204*** 0.0050 N/A N/A 
 0.1543*** 0.0020 N/A N/A 
 Three Month: DF = 202 Five Year: DF = 202 
Russia (3) = 1.0  Non-stationary 
variance
 
(3) =2.1 (5) =12.6** 
Parameter Coef. Std Err Coef. Std Err 
Constant -0.0017 0.0053 0.0046 0.0051 
MF 0.3186 0.2360 -0.1976 0.1860 
VIX -0.0067 0.0122 0.0031 0.0020 
SLOPE 0.0051 0.1820 -0.1364 0.1487 
0  N/A N/A 0.0009
* 
0.0005 
1 N/A N/A 0.3882
*** 
0.1037 
 N/A N/A 0.6239
*** 
0.2245 
 Three Month: DF = 524 Five Year: DF = 549 
South Korea (3) = 6.2* (5) = 96.9*** (3) =10.4* (5) =24.7* 
Parameter Coef. Std Err Coef. Std Err 
Constant 0.0038 0.0034 0.0029 0.0022 
MF 0.1159 0.1065 -0.5208
*** 
0.1225 
VIX 0.0015 0.0031 -0.0028 0.0046 
SLOPE 0.0761 0.0921 -0.3743
*** 
0.1322 
0  0.0006 0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 
1 0.3708
** 
0.1193 0.9497
*** 
0.1395 
 0.6851 0.5611 0.0391 0.1306 
***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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1
 Deviations in covered interest rate parity around the dates that Standard & Poor and Moodys 
upgraded the sovereigns are examined. There was no evidence that deviations in covered interest rate 
parity are affected by these rating upgrades. Moodys rating changes are very similar to Standard and 
Poor‟s so for the sake of brevity Moods ratings history of the sovereigns are not reported. 
2
 Specifically the start dates for the UK and South Korea data is January 2, 2003, for Norway, 
November 10, 2003, for Chile June 4, 2003, for Brazil November 10, 2003 and lastly, for Russian 
November 23, 2005. 
3
 The size factor (Small Minus Big) is the return from investing in a portfolio of small firms in excess 
of the return from investing in a portfolio of big firms. The value factor (High Minus Low) is the return 
from investing in high book to market value firms in excess of the returns from investing in a portfolio 
of low book to market value firms. The idea is that the empirical anomalies of excess returns in small 
firms and firms with high book to market capitalisation ratios that can not be explained by the capital 
asset pricing model are actually proxing for priced risk factors. 
4
 The correlation table is omitted for the sake of brevity. It is available from the author upon request. 
Also, there is still some controversy concerning precisely what source of systematic risk is being 
proxied by SMB and HML whereas there is a consensus that MF measures the systematic risk of 
investing in the market portfolio. To avoid any possible confusion concerning the interpretation of the 
results the MF is used. 
5
 The sample cannot be split into equal sub-periods in calendar time as the activity in different 
emerging markets varied by time period. For example, the Russian five-year forward exchange market 
was dormant for all of 2003 and 2004 and only became active in late August 2005. Meanwhile the 
South Korean five-year forward exchange market was active through out most months of the entire 
sample period, from January 1, 2003 to October 31 2006. 
6
 This is particularly true for the UK since the size of the DCIRP is typically less than one half of a 
basis point and can be a result of rounding. The economic consequence suggests that for every $1 
million transaction, an investor could earn less than $50. 
7
 A deviation of a little more than one basis point with a 20% violation is still economically trivial 
because a trader can only make about $100 a week for trades of $1 million. Additionally we repeated 
the GARCH regression analysis as reported in Table 6 for Norway and we could not find any proxy for 
credit risk that is even remotely significant in explaining the many, but small deviations in covered 
interest rate parity. 
8
 UK and Norway are not included in Table 6 as there is no evidence of violation in covered interest 
rate parity. 
